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artykuł poświęcony jest problemowi struktury 
libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości. Prezen-
tuje on mapę głównych pojęć i zasad tej teorii 
oraz bada jej możliwe uzasadnienia. artykuł wy-
jaśnia takie fundamentalne pojęcia jak posiada-
nie, własność, pierwotne zawłaszczenie, labory-
styczna czy posesoryjna teoria własności. arty-
kuł analizuje mocne i słabe strony alternatyw-
nych zasad libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwo-
ści rządzących pierwotnym nabyciem oraz kre-
śli szkic oryginalnego uzasadnienia posesoryjnej 
teorii własności. 
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The article is devoted to the problem of the 
structure of libertarian theory of justice. it 
tries to present a map of the main concepts 
and principles of this theory and to investigate 
its possible justifications. it explains such fun-
damental concepts as original appropriation, 
homesteading, labour theory of property or 
first possession theory of original appropria-
tion. The article shows merits and drawbacks 
of alternative libertarian principles of justice 
in first acquisition and proposes a sketch of 
an original justification for the first possession 
theory of original appropriation. 
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Introduction
The present paper tries to provide a road map of main accounts of original ap-
propriation within libertarian political philosophy. it explains what first appro-
priation is and what sorts of principles of justice are candidates for governing the 
processes of property titles distribution. The paper proceeds in accordance with 
the following order. in § 2 we distinguish between possession and ownership and 
explain what original appropriation is; in § 3 the idea of a principle of justice in 
original appropriation is introduced and main principles are presented and jux-
taposed; in § 4 we analyse and criticise the labour principle of justice in original 
appropriation; in the last substantive section – § 5 – we investigate the first pos-
session principle of justice in original appropriation and propose our justification 
thereof, trying at the same time to indicate its relative merits. The aim of this paper 
is to give a sketch of libertarian theory of justice, particularly its theory of justice 
in first acquisition.
Possession, Ownership and Original Appropriation 
in order to explain what original appropriation is, we first have to draw a crucial 
distinction between possessing a thing and owning it. to possess a thing is to 
have a possibility to deal with it at will, to control it for oneself or as an owner 
and therefore to exclude others from dealing with it. as von savigny points out, 
“by the possession of a thing, we always conceive the condition, in which not only 
one’s own dealing with the thing is physically possible, but every other person’s 
dealing with it is capable of being excluded” (1848). although analytically dif-
ferentiated by von savigny, elements of one’s own dealing with a thing and of 
excluding others are indispensably interdependent since it is impossible to do the 
former without being able to do the latter. Hence, the concept of possession “refers 
to either or both «control» and «exclusion of others». But it is clear that, where 
the former is used, it is intended to be synonymous with the latter. That is to say, 
one controls (in the sense of possesses) a thing inasmuch as what happens to that 
thing – allowing for the operation of physical laws – is determined by no other 
person than oneself” (steiner, 1994). Possession is thus a threefold, factual relation 
between the possessor, the thing possessed and the rest of mankind such as the 
possessor can control the thing to the exclusion of others. Possession is therefore 
a descriptive concept. 
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Ownership1, or property, on the other hand is a normative concept. to own 
a thing is to have a right to possess it, i.e. to be in such a juridical position that 
one’s claim to deal with the thing at will is a justified claim whereas claims of other 
persons are unjustified or less justified than the owner’s. as Barnett puts it, “rights 
are those claims a person has to legal enforcement that are justified, on balance, by 
the full constellation of relevant reasons, whether or not they are actually recog-
nized and enforced by a legal system” (2004). to recognise someone’s ownership 
is therefore to assert that his possession of a thing is just, rightful, lawful, licit or 
reasonable etc., is to conclude that he ought to possess the thing if such is his will, 
even if he actually does not possess it. as kinsella writes, “ownership is the right 
to control, use, or possess, while possession is actual control” (2009). Thus, own-
ership is a threefold normative or juridical relation between the owner, the thing 
owned and the rest of mankind such as the owner may control the thing to the 
exclusion of others because he has the best title to do it. Hence, the distinction 
between possession and ownership is a distinction between factual and normative 
relation.
Having drawn the above distinction between possession and ownership, we are 
ready to define original appropriation. Thus, original appropriation is acquiring 
ownership of unowned things. to originally appropriate is to establish property 
rights, i.e. justified claims to physical things that at the moment of acquisition are 
unowned. What is important to underline again, is that original appropriation is 
not about taking factual possession of things that are unpossessed or unowned – 
this process is called occupation and can be conceived as one of the possible inves-
titive facts that can result in original appropriation but should not be confounded 
with the latter. Neither is it about acquiring ownership of things already owned. 
it is about instituting new property rights to unowned things. as Nozick puts it, 
the topic of “original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things 
includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held” (2014), i.e. come 
to be owned. Hence, original appropriation is about creating normative relations 
between persons and things. 
Principles of Justice in Original Appropriation
When we already know what original appropriation is, we can ask a further 
question: How may original appropriation come about? What facts may invest 
1 On the exact and detailed account of ownership see Honore (1961).
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us with property titles? What must happen and in what kind of situations we 
ought to find ourselves for original appropriation to take place? How to become 
an owner of an unowned resource? answering all these and similar questions is 
a subject-matter of a theory of justice and principles that determine which facts 
are investitive facts or how to originally become an owner are principles of justice 
in original appropriation. in words of Nozick, “the process, or processes, by which 
unheld things may come to be held, the things that may come to be held by these 
processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process, and so on” 
are governed by the “principle of justice in acquisition” (2014).
By the same token, a theory of justice preoccupies itself with identifying princi-
ples of justice in two other realms of human action. The second one is a sphere of 
transferring already existing property titles. Principles of justice in property trans-
fers concern such issues as the ways in which an owner may transfer his property 
title to other persons, facts that may invest a new owner with the title, possible 
constraints on types of titles that may not be transferred etc. again, the subject-
matter of principles of justice in transfers is not a factual, physical act of transfer-
ring things between persons but identifying licit transfers of existing property 
titles to these things; a thing or possession thereof can be transferred without the 
title to it being transferred as e.g. in the case of theft when even though possession 
is transferred, the title is only violated and stays where it was. as Nozick puts it, 
“the second topic” within a theory of justice “concerns the transfer of holdings from 
one person to another. By what processes may a person transfer holdings to an-
other? How may a person acquire a holding from another who holds it? under this 
topic comes general descriptions of voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other 
hand) fraud, as well as reference to particular conventional details fixed upon in 
a given society. The complicated truth about this subject we shall call the principle 
of justice in transfer” (2014). libertarian theory of justice identifies consent and 
title transfer theory of contracts as principles of justice in transfers and argues 
against alternative theories such as the will theory or the promised expectations 
model of contracts. 
These two subject-matters of a theory of justice (original appropriation and 
transfers) are fields of interest of distributive justice. The third sphere of a theory 
of justice lies beyond the scope of distributive concerns and pertains to the ques-
tion of rectification of committed injustices. in this area relevant questions include 
issues connected with forfeiture of rights, kinds of liability, sorts of rectification, 
viz. retribution, restitution, compensation or deterrence, etc. “The existence of 
past injuries (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings) 
raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice 
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in holdings... what, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What 
obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is 
worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it would 
have been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things change 
if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in the act 
of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? is an injustice done to someone 
whose holding was itself based upon unrectified injustice? How far back must one 
go in wiping clean the historical slate of injustices? What may victims of injustice 
permissibly do in order to rectify the injustices being done to them, including 
the many injustices done by persons acting through their government?” (Nozick, 
2014). There are discussions going on within libertarian scholarship between pro-
ponents of retributivist and restitutive theories of rectification and between strict 
liability and negligence accounts of responsibility.
also within the purview of our main topic, i.e. original appropriation, lib-
ertarianism identifies competing principles of justice in first acquisition. Three 
theories can be mentioned here. The first one is a conventional-contractarian 
theory of first appropriation. according to this approach, principles that decide 
when property rights are acquired by individuals are established conventionally 
or through social contract. Therefore, there must be some community acceptance 
for property rights to be instituted and this common or contractual recognition 
of property rights is their ultimate justification. amongst libertarian scholars this 
conventional-contractarian theory of acquisition is represented by Jan Narve-
son (2001) for whom libertarian property rights are the implication of the social 
contract (Nowakowski, 2016). in the present paper we will not elaborate on the 
conventional-contractarian theory of original appropriation because of its so-far 
limited impact and atypicality within libertarianism. We will focus instead on 
two main libertarian theories: labour theory of original appropriation and first 
possession (or occupancy) theory of original appropriation. 
according to the labour theory of original appropriation, the investitive fact 
consists in mixing one’s labour with an unowned thing. This investitive process 
of mixing one’s labour with a thing is also called homesteading (Block, 2008). 
Thus, the principle of justice in original appropriation is named the homestead 
principle. The idea that mixing one’s labour constitutes investitive fact comes from 
John locke and is espoused by such prominent libertarian scholars as inter alia 
Murray Rothbard (1998) or Walter Block (2008). in locke’s own original words 
the homestead principle is explained as follows: “every man has a property in his 
own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, 
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he re-
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moves out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property. it being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it 
in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right 
of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, 
no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there 
is enough, and as good, left in common for others. He that is nourished by the 
acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in 
the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the 
nourishment is his. i ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? 
or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he 
picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing 
else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added 
something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and 
so they became his private right” (1980). 
The labour theory of original appropriation should not be confused with the 
first possession theory of original appropriation. as we said in the second para-
graph, possession is a possibility to deal with a thing at will to the exclusion of 
others. What is important to notice about this definition is that to have such 
a possibility, it is not necessary to even touch the thing, let alone to expend or mix 
one’s labour with it. One can be in a position to deal with a thing at will when 
there is no physical obstacle (like crossing a river or climbing a mountain) to deal 
with it and when there is no other person in such a position. so, for instance, if 
one sees a gold bar before him and intends to deal with it for himself and there is 
no other person in a similar position, he has already taken possession of the gold 
bar without even touching it. Nor mixing one’s labour with a thing is sufficient 
for taking possession of it. as epstein (1979) shows by quoting Pierson vs. Post, in 
the case of the hot pursuit of wild animal, mixing hunter’s labour with the game 
is something different than taking control of the wild creature and therefore it is 
not sufficient for acquiring property rights in that thing. although the plaintiff, 
Post, expended labour in the pursuit of a fox and in this sense mixed this labour 
with the worn out animal, it was not enough to take a control over still running 
beast. The defendant, Pierson, came to the spot and caught the tired animal. The 
problem for the court was to confront with the assumption that “each person is 
entitled to ownership and control over his own labor. Where the pursuer by his 
efforts has worn down the fox, the late capture by the rival in effect amounts to an 
inadmissible appropriation of labor which the law should prevent. The justifica-
tion for the hot pursuit rule does not, however, explain all the recurrent features 
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of the law. some labor goes unrequited when two pursue and one loses. again, 
if a has given up the chase when confronted with sudden perils, B may capture 
with impunity even though his task was made immeasurably easier by a’s prior 
labors. Conversely, there are some things acquired not through labor but only by 
chance or good fortune and one who so acquires takes full and indefeasible title 
even though there was, except in a metaphorical sense, no expenditure of labor in 
either acquisition or cultivation” (epstein, 1979). Thus, the court adjudicated that 
mixing labour with a thing in the case of the hot pursuit did not equal taking pos-
session of the fox and that even “the wounding of the animal when in hot pursuit 
did not amount to possession because of the many events that could have occurred 
between the original wounding and the eventual capture. The court in decid-
ing for the defendant Pierson took the middle position, holding that the mortal 
wounding of such beast, by one not abandoning his pursuit may, with the utmost 
propriety, be deemed possession of him” (epstein, 1979). Therefore the property 
rights to the fox were acquired by the defendant who took first control over the 
fox, not by the plaintiff who mixed his labour with the animal.
Hence, according to the first possession theory of original appropriation the 
investitive fact consists in taking an unowned thing in first possession, i.e. in 
coming to the position in which it is possible to deal with the thing at will to 
the exclusion of others. Thus, the principle of justice in first acquisition is called 
occupancy principle or first possession principle. The idea that taking first posses-
sion constitutes investitive fact comes from Roman law and is espoused by such 
prominent libertarian scholars as inter alia Hans-Hermann Hoppe (e.g. 2015), Ri-
chard epstein (1979) or stephan kinsella (2008). as the latter says, “the focus on 
creation distracts from the crucial role of first occupation as a property rule for ad-
dressing the fundamental fact of scarcity. first occupation, not creation or labor, 
is both necessary and sufficient for the homesteading of unowned scarce resources. 
One reason for the undue stress placed on creation as the source of property rights 
may be the focus by some on labor as the means to homestead unowned resources. 
This is manifest in the argument that one homesteads unowned property with 
which one mixes one’s labor because one «owns» one’s labor. However, as Palmer 
correctly points out, «occupancy, not labor, is the act by which external things 
become property». By focusing on first occupancy, rather than on labor, as the 
key to homesteading, there is no need to place creation as the fount of property 
rights, as Objectivists and others do. instead, property rights must be recognized 
in first-comers” (2008).
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Ramifications of the Labour Theory 
of Original Appropriation
There are sundry ways of justifying labour theory of original appropriation. each 
of these ways reveals moral or logical appeal of the labour theory. One of these jus-
tifications has just been mentioned in the above quotation. labour as investitive 
fact refers to human creativity, ingenuity or rationality as values and virtues that 
are cherished in themselves. Then, because property rights are instituted by labour, 
they reflect these values and virtues; what is more, they promote them. Property 
rights viewed in this light can be construed as necessary conditions for reaching 
human fulfilment and happiness. in this manner for instance Randy Barnett can 
picture property rights as conducive to human flourishing and happiness: “if hu-
man beings are to survive and pursue happiness, peace and prosperity while living 
in society with others, then their laws must not violate certain background natural 
rights” (2004). similarly, labour refers to the concept of desert and effort. it opens 
the possibility of justifying one’s claims to control particular resources as deserved 
claims, based on effort put into the discovery or production of these resources. if 
he who expended his labour, who devoted his resources, who created an economic 
good from useless and hostile environment, who transformed an unowned waste 
land into fertile fields before anyone else wanted to invest the time and energy to 
do so, does not deserve the fruit of his effort, who does? 
But the most important justification for property claims provided by the la-
bour theory consists in a logical chain of steps by which something that is al-
ready owned is annexed to something that belongs to no one, thereby rendering 
the latter also a part of one’s estate. The chain unfolds in the succeeding links: 
1) a owns a’s body; 2) because a’s labour is just a specific purposeful movement 
of a’s body, then a must also own a’s labour; 3) a can transform an unowned 
resource only by his labour; a transforms it by attaching his labour to it; 4) now, 
when the transformed resource is mixed or permeated with a’s labour which was 
a’s property, it must also be a’s property. 
an ample criticism has been issued against this line of argument. actually, 
each of the consecutive steps in the above chain of reasons has been attacked as 
unjustified and untenable. according to stephan kinsella, it is the second link in 
the chain that is broken. for it is impossible to own one’s labour. Only tangible 
things can be owned because conflicts can arise only over tangible things and the 
function of property rights is to avoid conflicts. if intangible things were rendered 
ownable, then conflicts over them would become possible. such alleged property 
rights to intangible things would then generate conflicts, what would effectively 
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make them anti-rights rather than rights: norms that “contradict the very purpose 
of norms” (Hoppe, 2012). apparently, labour is not a tangible object; it is not an 
object at all but a type of human action. actions in turn, as not tangible objects, 
cannot be owned. so, kinsella writes: “there is no need to maintain the strange 
view that one «owns» one’s labor in order to own things one first occupies. labor is 
a type of action, and action is not ownable; rather, it is the way that some tangible 
things (e.g., bodies) act in the world” (2008). 
a problem involved in this criticism was pointed out by Hillel steiner who 
noticed that labour as a kind of purposeful movement of a body is from the physi-
cal point of view nothing else than an energy expended by the body and attached 
to external objects. Because matter (tangible things) and energy are translatable 
into each other, there is no fundamental obstacle for adding and owning labour 
– labour is just a different state of matter. as steiner puts it, “our bodies produce 
energy. They convert body tissue into energy, some of which gets expended in 
our acting. a good deal of this expended energy is simply abandoned by us in the 
course of this acting. it is absorbed into parts of the external environment that we 
make no consequent claim to. Other portions of our expended energy are infused 
into parts of the external environment, transforming their features in various 
ways. sometimes we claim these things for ourselves as the fruits of our labour. 
and sometimes, where such transformation violates another’s rights, it forms the 
basis of a claim against us” (1994).
steiner, on the other hand, criticises the third and forth link in the above chain 
of reasons. He points out that if a thing which is undoubtedly owned by us, like 
our labour, is attached to an external object that is also undoubtedly owned by 
us, then the resultant object is perforce our property. if element a belongs to the 
set X and element B belongs to the set X, then a + B must also belong to the set 
X. The problem is, that if we attach a thing we own to the thing that we do not 
own, the conclusion that the latter thing becomes our property does not perforce 
follow. Quite to the contrary, if element a belongs to the set X and element B does 
not belong to the set X, then a + B cannot belong to the set X. is there then any 
other reason for which one should conclude that it is B that became an element 
of X rather than a which ceased to be an element of X? “The answer, as we know 
only too well, is uncertain. for any claim, to the effect that its being infused with 
my labour makes this land mine, can be met with the counter-claim that, in so 
infusing the land, i was relinquishing my title to that labour” (1994). to the same 
result asks Nozick: “Why isn’t mixing what i own with what i don’t own a way 
of losing what i own rather than a way of gaining what i don’t? if i own a can of 
tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout 
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the sea, do i thereby come to own the sea, or have i foolishly dissipated tomato 
juice?” (2014).
to this it is possible to answer two things. it is true that mixing one’s labour 
with an unowned resource does not perforce render it owned as it is the case with 
mixing one’s labour with already owned object. However, it does not have to do it 
to provide sufficient justification for the claim of the homesteader because when 
this allegedly unowned resource is infused with and contains homesteader’s la-
bour and is then taken by someone else, this labour is willy nilly taken with it and 
there is no doubt that this labour is a property of the homesteader. Hence, even 
though the resource might not be perforce owned, taking it from the homesteader 
without his consent is tantamount to involuntary taking of homesteader’s labour 
which is his property, i.e. it is tantamount to theft. as eric Mack points out, “if 
John has so mixed his labor with a bit of raw material – transforming, let us say, 
a branch into a nicely shaped and useful spear – the resulting spear embodies 
John’s non-abandoned rightful held labor. Hence, if tom comes along and makes 
off with that spear, tom violates John’s retained right over that invested labor. 
since tom cannot make off with that spear without making off with John’s invest-
ed labor, we naturally say that John has a right to the spear vis-a-vis tom” (2009). 
second of all, it is always a problem to say when particular condition is fulfilled in 
a given case, regardless of the theory that is actually presupposed. is mixing a can 
of juice enough? Certainly not. ten cans, twenty, one hundred...? This is classical 
continuum problem and therefore it is up for the courts to decide and to establish 
some convention. The same problem emerges on the first possession theory. is 
chasing a wild animal enough to possess it? Wounding it, mortally wounding it, 
killing it...? There is no principled way of solving such questions – regardless of the 
theory of justice in original appropriation. We always need conventions to seal up 
our theoretical system.
finally, also the first step in the above chain of reasons has been contested. as 
Richard epstein pointed out, obviously labour theory is not an independent theo-
ry of original appropriation because it presupposes that we own our bodies. How-
ever, it cannot be the case that we own our bodies because we mixed them with 
our labour – this reasoning would result in regressus ad infinitum since then we 
would have to explain “our labour” as produced by our bodies and so on, and so 
forth. Hence, the labour theory must presuppose some other, more fundamental 
theory of original appropriation of our bodies that justifies and constitutes raison 
d’ être of the labour theory. if the labour theory is contingent upon this more fun-
damental theory, then the question arises whether the labour theory is not redun-
dant. That should be sufficient to have only one, fundamental theory of original 
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appropriation that would explain both ownership of our bodies and ownership of 
external resources. according to epstein, this theory is the first possession theory 
of original appropriation: “Why does labor itself create any rights in a thing? The 
labor theory rests at least upon the belief that each person owns himself. Yet that 
claim, unless it be accepted as bedrock and unquestioningly, must be justified in 
some way (leaving aside the question of to whom the justification must be made). 
The obvious line for justification is that each person is in possession of himself, if 
not by choice or conscious act, then by a kind of natural necessity. Yet if that pos-
session is good enough to establish ownership of self, then why is not possession 
of external things, unclaimed by others, sufficient as well? The irony of the point 
should be manifest. The labor theory is called upon to aid the theory that posses-
sion is the root of title; yet it depends for its own success upon the proposition that 
the possession of self is the root of title to self” (epstein, 1979).
Ramifications of the First Possession Theory 
of Original Appropriation 
in this last paragraph we would like to focus on what we claim is the best justi-
fication for the first possession theory of original appropriation and what are the 
ramifications of both this theory and its justification. We suggest that the ultimate 
justification of this theory is not usually evoked avoidance of conflicts – although 
it is a necessary consequence of the justification we are going to present here – but 
a necessary condition of rationality of a conceptual system (it is good to remember 
that rights have form of deontic propositions and therefore they also form a con-
ceptual or theoretical system). let us present a sketch of our argument.
for a conceptual system to be rational it is necessary to be non-contradictory 
(Popper, 2002). Nothing that violates the law of non-contradiction can be true, 
justified or for that matter rational (Łukasiewicz, 1987, 1988). in a system of ra-
tionally justified rights – so-called natural rights – existence of contrary rights and 
duties, let alone contradictory ones is ex definitione off limits since contrary rights 
violate the law of non-contradiction. as steiner puts it with reference to rights as 
such, although his argument seems to work impeccably only with natural rights, 
“mutual consistency – or compossibility – of all the rights in a proposed set of 
rights is at least a necessary condition of that set being possible one. a set of rights 
being a possible set is, i take it, itself a necessary condition of the plausibility of 
whatever principle of justice generates that set. any justice principle that deliv-
ers a set of rights yielding contradictory judgements about the permissibility of 
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a particular action either is unrealizable or (what comes to the same thing) must 
be modified to be realizable” (1994). Hence, systems of rights in which there are 
contradictory or contrary rights is off limits insofar as its rational justification is 
concerned. Basically, such a system can never be rationally justified. it is obvious 
on the other hand that one of the most important and direct ramifications of 
a system of non-contradictory rights is avoidance of conflicts. it is the case be-
cause for a person who abides by the norms of such a system it is impossible to 
find himself in the situation of conflicting rights or duties. so, on our account it is 
not so much that property rights are justified functionally or teleologically as be-
ing conducive to conflict avoidance as that their function of conflict avoidance is 
a logical consequence of their fundamental vindication as rational (non-contradic-
tory) allocations of individual jurisdictions (Barnett, 2004) or spheres of freedom 
(steiner, 1994).
Now the question is: What set of rights can be a set of non-contradictory 
rights? following steiner we can say that rights predicate about human action. 
Because each action-token always takes place in a specific time and space, it can 
be given an exhaustive description in extensional terms of its spatio-temporal com-
ponents. We can therefore say that two action-tokens are incompossible when they 
share at least one physical component; on the other hand, action-tokens are com-
possible when they do not have any physical components in common. Now, rights 
that “oblige” people to perform two or more action-tokens that share at least one 
physical component are perforce contradictory rights – they “oblige” people to do 
what is incompossible to do; whereas rights which oblige people to perform action-
tokens that do not have common components are non-contradictory rights. How 
to make sure that rights never become contradictory? it is necessary and sufficient 
to construe of rights as rights to exclusive control of physical components of ac-
tions, i.e. as rights to possess tangible things. if physical components of actions are 
unequivocally distributed amongst people, if each and every physical component 
is unambiguously and exclusively assigned to one and only one person, then there 
can never be rights to action-tokens that share physical components with each 
other and therefore there can never be rights that oblige people to perform incom-
possible action-tokens (steiner, 1994). as steiner points out, “a set of categorically 
compossible domains, constituted by a set of property rights, is one in which each 
person’s rights are demarcated in such a way as to be mutually exclusive of every 
other person’s rights... we will interpret this to mean that no two persons simulta-
neously have rights to one and the same physical thing” (1994).
Because the nature of possession is such that it is impossible for two or more 
people to possess the same thing at the same time – although it seems possible for 
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two or more people to simultaneously mix their labour with the same thing (e.g. 
when two people chase the same wild animal) – then assigning rights to people 
who took first possession of a thing, who are first-comers, perforce avoids non-
contradictoriness of rights and conflicts between people since the dawn of time. 
for it is always and from the very beginning clear who has title to which physical 
resource as well as which resources are still up for appropriating and which are 
not so available. as Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes, “with regard to the purpose of 
conflict avoidance, no alternative to private property and original appropriation 
exists. in the absence of prestabilized harmony among actors, conflict can only be 
prevented if all goods are always in the private ownership of specific individuals 
and it is always clear who owns what and who does not. also, conflicts can only 
be avoided from the beginning of mankind if private property is acquired by acts 
of original appropriation (instead of by mere declarations or words of latecomers)” 
(2012). it is by definition inconceivable for more than one person to be in a posi-
tion in which it is physically possible to deal with a thing at will to the exclusion of 
others. Neither is it conceivable for more than one person to simultaneously come 
to such a position. Thus, taking first possession of scarce resources as basis of title 
and as principle of justice in original appropriation guarantees non-contradictori-
ness of rights and avoidance of conflicts since the dawn of time. 
Conclusions
in the paper we presented main accounts of original appropriation within liber-
tarianism. We contrasted two dominant theories of first acquisition of property 
rights: labour principle of justice and occupancy principle of justice in original ap-
propriation. some of the main problems of respective theories – especially labour 
theory – were investigated. We argued that first possession principle of justice in 
original appropriation finds its justification not in teleological and functional ac-
count of conflict avoidance but in inherent rationality and non-contradictoriness 
as well as – drawing on steiner – categorical compossibility which naturally result 
in conflict avoidance. 
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